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I. INTRODUCTION
In Town of Greece v. Galloway,1 Justice Anthony Kennedy
delivered the Supreme Court’s opinion which upheld a town board’s
practice of inviting citizens of the town to deliver a ceremonial prayer to
open the monthly board meetings.2 Although almost all of the prayers
were sectarian in the sense that they mentioned Jesus Christ, the Court
specifically found that the town board permitted anyone to deliver the
opening remarks and that the town’s non-discrimination policy made
this practice constitutional under the provision in the First Amendment
* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; Distinguished Professor and C. Blake
McDowell, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. I wish to thank the Akron
chapters of the Jewish Law Students Association and the Federalist Society for inviting me to
debate Professor Patrick Garry on this topic.
1. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (upholding practice of Town Board
in conducting a ceremonial prayer at the commencement of meetings of the board).
2. Id. at 1828.
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prohibiting “the establishment of religion.”3 In this Article, I discuss the
role of tradition and policy in the context of this case and in the
interpretation generally of the Constitution.
The great jurisprudential battle that has raged in the Supreme Court
for nearly a century, and the question that our society has struggled with
since the advent of the Civil War, is whether the Constitution is a
command by our ancestors that we retain the same political structures,
social hierarchies, and cultural traditions that they had; or, whether the
Constitution reflects ideals of liberty, equality, fairness, and tolerance to
which our ancestors aspired and to which they expected us to aspire.4
That struggle between rules and standards, doctrine and principles,
conventionalism and consequentialism, tradition and policy in the
interpretation of the Constitution is played out again within Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway.
Professor Garry was right, and I was wrong, about how the
Supreme Court would rule in Town of Greece v. Galloway and in the
reasoning that Justice Kennedy would embrace in resolving that case.5
As our distinguished guest predicted in our debate, the Supreme Court
upheld the practice of sectarian Christian prayer conducted by the Town
Board of Greece, and as he further predicted, Justice Kennedy utilized a
“historical” mode of analysis justifying such prayers on the ground that
local governments have traditionally engaged in the practice. Justice
Kennedy seemingly overruled decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence
that had interpreted the Establishment Clause by reference to the purpose
and effect of the challenged state action; instead, Justice Kennedy
appeared to elevate “custom” to be the primary determinant of
constitutionality.
But all is not lost. Justice Kennedy’s reliance upon custom, or
“tradition,” as the principal touchstone of constitutional interpretation is
tenuous. Although Justice Kennedy prepares his opinions with tradition,
he always leavens them with policy. Justice Kennedy is not a reliable
partner to Justice Antonin Scalia and the other conservative justices in
3. See id. at 1816 (stating, “The town at no point excluded or denied an opportunity to a
would-be prayer giver. Its leaders maintained that a minister or layperson of any persuasion,
including an atheist, could give the invocation.”); id. at 1824 (stating, “So long as the town
maintains a policy of nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its
borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.”).
4. Compare Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. I participated in a debate with Professor Patrick Garry hosted by The University of Akron
School of Law. After that debate, Professor Garry published a summary of his arguments. See
generally Patrick M. Garry, Prayer and the Meaning of the Establishment Clause: A Debate on
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 6 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POLY 1 (2015).
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their attempt to “turn back the clock” to the days when intolerance was
the norm and government was powerless to unseat privilege. While
attentive to tradition in this case and others, Justice Kennedy ultimately
bases his decisions upon the deeper meaning and ultimate purposes of
the Constitution. Therein lies hope for the future.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Section II discusses Justice
Kennedy’s balancing of tradition and policy in previous cases, while
Section III discusses that balance in Town of Greece v. Galloway.
Section IV argues that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is consistent with a
rigorous understanding of separation of church and state in that the
government may not dictate the content of official prayers. Section V
argues that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is consistent with his position that
offense taken in response to official prayers or religious displays is not
constitutionally relevant. Finally, Section VI discusses the future of the
neutrality principle.
II. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S BALANCING OF TRADITION AND POLICY IN
PREVIOUS CASES
In the field of fundamental rights, Justice Kennedy has repeatedly
demonstrated that he is not beholden to tradition. In Lawrence v. Texas,6
a case striking down a law that made homosexuality a crime, Justice
Kennedy wrote, “history and tradition are the starting point but not in all
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”7 In
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,8 although concurring with the majority that
under the circumstances the petitioner did not have a constitutional right
to be recognized as the lawful father of the child, Justice Kennedy left
open the possibility that such a right might exist in special
circumstances. In that case, he joined Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
concurring opinion, where Justice O’Connor warned the majority that it
must not “foreclose the unanticipated” by adopting a strictly historical
approach to constitutional analysis.9 Most recently, in United States v.
Windsor,10 Justice Kennedy implicitly found that preserving traditional

6. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down state law making same-sex
intercourse a crime).
7. Id. at 572 (Kennedy, J.) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
8. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (denying petitioner’s claim to be the lawful
father of a child born to a married woman).
9. Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (“I would not foreclose the unanticipated by
the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis.”).
10. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down provision of federal law
that refused to recognize same-sex marriages for purposes of federal law).
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notions of marriage was not even a legitimate reason for the federal
government to refuse to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples11
and ruled that the federal Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional
because of its unlawful purpose and effect.12
The tension between conformity to tradition and mindfulness of
consequences was also evident in Justice Kennedy’s recent opinion in
United States v. Alvarez,13 a First Amendment case in which the
Supreme Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act, a federal statute that
made it a crime to lie about having earned military honors. In his opinion
for the Court, Justice Kennedy looked first to history, declaring that this
type of law was not consonant with tradition:
The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government advances: that false statements receive no First Amendment protection.
Our prior decisions have not confronted a measure, like the Stolen
14
Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more.

In defining and circumscribing that tradition, however, Justice Kennedy
resorted to consequentialist analysis. Justice Kennedy noted that while
many longstanding criminal laws make lying a crime, there is a crucial
difference between those traditional kinds of laws and the Stolen Valor
Act. The Stolen Valor Act, wrote Justice Kennedy, is different from
perjury, fraud, and defamation because of the effects that flow from such
speech. Justice Kennedy distinguished cases involving “defamation,
fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false
statement, such as an invasion of privacy or the costs of vexatious
litigation.”15 In contrast, the Stolen Valor Act was not intended to
redress a concrete harm visited upon individuals but, rather, sought to
vindicate a widely-shared cultural belief that it is wrong to lie about
having been awarded military honors. As Justice Kennedy pointed out,
11. See id. at 2693 (Kennedy, J.) (stating, “The arguments put forward by BLAG are just as
candid about the congressional purpose to influence or interfere with state sovereign choices about
who may be married.”); Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of
the U.S. House of Representatives, United States v. Windsor at 28, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12307), 2013 WL 267026 (stating, “multiple rational bases support Congress’ decision to retain the
traditional definition of marriage for federal-law purposes”).
12. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-95 (Kennedy, J.) (identifying the unlawful purposes and
effects of the federal law); e.g., id. at 2693. Justice Kennedy states:
This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that
class. The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose
a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.
13. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (striking down federal Stolen Valor
Act).
14. Id. at 2545 (Kennedy, J.).
15. Id. (emphasis added).
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counterspeech is the proper remedy to redress that type of harm.16 The
problem with the Stolen Valor Act, ruled Justice Kennedy, was that it
punished utterances regardless of the setting of the speech, the speaker’s
purpose, or the nature of the harms that were likely to result.17 In short,
while Justice Kennedy purported to invoke tradition in striking down the
Stolen Valor Act, in reality he based his decision on the purpose and
effect of the law.
So it is in Town of Greece v. Galloway as well. While upholding
the practice of ceremonial prayer as consistent with our nation’s
traditions, Justice Kennedy nevertheless ruled that the constitutionality
of the practice ultimately turns upon its purpose and effect.
III. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S BALANCING OF TRADITION AND POLICY IN
TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY
For over forty years, the Supreme Court has utilized
consequentialist reasoning to define the parameters of the Establishment
Clause. Throughout this period, the constitutionality of government
action under the Establishment Clause has turned upon the actual intent
and practical effect of such action. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,18 a 1971 case
authored by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court stated that, to be
constitutional, the government’s action must have both a secular intent
and a primarily secular effect.19 In 1989, in County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union (“Allegheny County”),20 Justice
Blackmun tweaked the Lemon test to mean that the government must not
act with the intent to endorse religion, nor may the primary effect of the

16. See id. at 2549 (stating, “The Government has not shown, and cannot show, why
counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest.”); id. at 2550 (stating, “The remedy for
speech that is false is speech that is true.”).
17. See id. at 2547. Justice Kennedy stated:
Here the lie was made in a public meeting, but the statute would apply with equal force
to personal, whispered conversations within a home. The statute seeks to control and
suppress all false statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and settings.
And it does so entirely without regard to whether the lie was made for the purpose of
material gain.
18. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down state laws channeling public
funds to religious schools).
19. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted):
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”
20. Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 492 U.S. 573 (1989).

16

JUSTICE KENNEDY’S OPINION IN TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY

[6:1

law be to endorse religion.21 Justice Kennedy dissented in Allegheny
County22 and in Salazar v. Buono in 2009,23 and although he applied the
“no endorsement” test, he signaled that he continued to doubt whether it
was the proper test.24 One of the closely watched questions in Town of
Greece v. Galloway was whether Justice Kennedy would apply the “no
endorsement” test or whether he would switch to a “tradition” test.
Professor Garry correctly predicted that he would embrace the
“tradition” test.
Tradition is the preferred interpretive mode of conservatives
generally, for obvious reasons. Traditionally, same-sex couples could
not marry;25 traditionally, women were not eligible to attend military
academies;26 traditionally, capital punishment was not considered “cruel
and unusual.”27 Liberals, in contrast, usually utilize a policy approach to
interpret the Constitution, such as the Equal Protection principle that
“persons who are similarly situated must be treated alike”;28 the
understanding that the Due Process Clause guarantees “the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”;29 or the
idea that the concept of liberty in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

21. See id. at 592 (stating, “In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to
whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’
religion, a concern that has long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”).
22. See id. at 655-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
23. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2009) (remanding the case to the district court to permit
it to determine whether the primary effect of the government’s action regarding the cross had been
to endorse religion).
24. See id. at 720 (Kennedy, J.) (stating, “Even if, however, this standard were the
appropriate one . . .”).
25. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (Kennedy, J.) (citing the
House Report on the Defense of Marriage Act and stating, “The House Report announced its
conclusion that ‘it is both appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage”‘); id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating, “As I
have observed before, the Constitution does not forbid the government to enforce traditional moral
and sexual norms.”).
26. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating,
“Today the Court shuts down an institution that has served the people of the Commonwealth of
Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century and a half . . . . It counts for nothing the long
tradition, enduring down to the present, of men’s military colleges supported by both States and the
Federal Government.”).
27. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163 (1976) (ruling that the penalty of death for
the crime of murder does not under all circumstances constitute “cruel and unusual punishment”).
28. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
(stating, “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall
‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”).
29. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (stating, “The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.’”) (citation omitted).
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prohibits the government from interfering with an individual’s “intimate
and personal choices” concerning family life or bodily integrity.30
In Town of Greece v. Galloway, Justice Kennedy briefly rejected
the “no endorsement” test in favor of the “tradition” test. In referring to
Allegheny County, Justice Kennedy quoted the dissenters approvingly:
Four dissenting Justices disputed that endorsement could be the proper
test, as it likely would condemn a host of traditional practices that recognize the role religion plays in our society, among them legislative
prayer and the “forthrightly religious” Thanksgiving proclamations is31
sued by nearly every President since Washington.

Justice Kennedy did not expressly overrule the result in Allegheny
County, nor did he expressly state that the Establishment Clause permits
the government to endorse religion. He did, however, proceed to analyze
the constitutionality of the Town Board’s practice by looking to
tradition, and he found that “[t]he prayers delivered in the town of
Greece do not fall outside the tradition this Court has recognized.”32
Moreover, he did not analyze whether the ceremonial prayers had the
purpose or effect of advancing, promoting, or endorsing religion.
However, there are portions of Justice Kennedy’s opinion that
preserve the “purpose” and “effect” prongs of the “no endorsement” test.
Justice Kennedy repeatedly emphasized that prayers before official
bodies are a form of “ceremonial prayer,” intended to solemnize an
occasion, and that if in practice the prayer deviates from this historical
purpose it would become unconstitutional:
In rejecting the suggestion that legislative prayer must be nonsectarian,
the Court does not imply that no constraints remain on its content. The
relevant constraint derives from its place at the opening of legislative
sessions, where it is meant to lend gravity to the occasion and reflect
values long part of the Nation’s heritage. Prayer that is solemn and respectful in tone, that invites lawmakers to reflect upon shared ideals
and common ends before they embark on the fractious business of
governing, serves that legitimate function. If the course and practice
30. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). The Court stated:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
31. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1821 (2014). (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)).
32. Id. at 1824.
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over time shows that the invocations denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion, many present may consider the prayer to fall short of the desire to elevate the
purpose of the occasion and to unite lawmakers in their common effort. That circumstance would present a different case than the one
presently before the Court.
The tradition reflected in Marsh permits chaplains to ask their own
God for blessings of peace, justice, and freedom that find appreciation
among people of all faiths. That a prayer is given in the name of Jesus,
Allah, or Jehovah, or that it makes passing reference to religious doctrines, does not remove it from that tradition. These religious themes
provide particular means to universal ends. Prayer that reflects beliefs
specific to only some creeds can still serve to solemnize the occasion,
so long as the practice over time is not “exploited to proselytize or ad33
vance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.

Another legitimate purpose of ceremonial prayer that Justice
Kennedy approves is to recognize members of the clergy for their
contributions to the community:
The inclusion of a brief, ceremonial prayer as part of a larger exercise
in civic recognition suggests that its purpose and effect are to
acknowledge religious leaders and the institutions they represent rather
34
than to exclude or coerce nonbelievers.

Even though Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected the “no endorsement”
test, he implicitly retained it. In effect, Justice Kennedy implicitly ruled
that the official prayers in this case had neither the purpose nor the
primary effect of endorsing religion, but rather were made to solemnize
the occasion and to recognize religious leaders in the community. In
future cases, if the plaintiffs can prove that the purpose and effect of an
official prayer does not serve a legitimate purpose such as solemnization
or recognition, then the prayer would be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s opinion invokes not only tradition
but a principle that is consistent with the most rigorous understanding of
separation of church and state – the necessity that the government must
not dictate the content of prayers whatever the setting.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT DICTATE THE CONTENT OF OFFICIAL
PRAYERS
The plaintiffs in this case did not contend that ceremonial prayers at
33.
34.

Id. at 1823 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1827 (emphasis added).

2015]

19

all official functions are unconstitutional.35 That option was foreclosed
by the case Marsh v. Chambers,36 in which the Supreme Court upheld
the practice of a prayer to open legislative sessions.37 This particular
litigation strategy proved to be wise; in Town of Greece v. Galloway, not
a single Justice of the Court voted to overrule Marsh v. Chambers.38
Instead the petitioners argued that the Town Board’s prayer practice
violated the Constitution because the Town Board had followed a
consistent pattern of inviting Christian pastors who invariably delivered
sectarian prayers.39 The petitioners contended, and the dissenters found,
that this pattern of conduct constituted official endorsement of one
particular religion.40 In particular, the petitioners suggested that the
Town Board should have instructed its guest clergy to deliver
nonsectarian prayers.41
The argument that the government is required to promote
nonsectarian prayer was bound to lose. Justice Kennedy had expressed
the opposing view vigorously and at some length in the 1992 case of Lee
v. Weisman.42 In that case, Justice Kennedy struck down a prayer that
was offered at a high school graduation even though school officials had
given careful guidelines to their guest, Rabbi Gutterman, and the Rabbi
followed those guidelines and composed and delivered a wonderful

35. See generally Brief for Respondents at 19, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5230742 (stating, “Petitioner and its amici seek to extend Marsh far
beyond what it actually decided.”).
36. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding state legislature’s practice of
beginning legislative session with a chaplain’s prayer).
37. See id. at 795 (upholding the “unbroken practice” of legislative prayer).
38. See Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1841-42 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (stating, “I agree with the
Court’s decision in Marsh v. Chambers upholding the Nebraska Legislature’s tradition of beginning
each session with a chaplain’s prayer.”).
39. Brief for Respondents, supra note 34.
40. See id. at 58 (defending the “endorsement” test against an “anemic version of the
coercion test”); Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1841 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating, “Having applied my
legal judgment to the relevant facts, I conclude, like Justice KAGAN, that the town of Greece failed
to make reasonable efforts to include prayer givers of minority faiths, with the result that, although
it is a community of several faiths, its prayer givers were almost exclusively persons of a single
faith.”).
41. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 34, at 18 (stating, “Petitioner does not ask its guest
chaplains to avoid proselytizing or disparaging remarks, let alone to pray in an inclusive manner.
With no instruction to do otherwise, petitioner’s guest chaplains routinely offer prayers acceptable
only to Christians.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 39-40, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.
Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5939896. Attorney Douglas Laycock stated:
We think the town needs a policy. The policy should give guidelines to chaplains that
say: Stay away from points in which believers are known to disagree. And we think the
town should do what it can to ameliorate coercion. It should tell the clergy: Don’t ask
people to physically participate. That’s the most important thing.
42. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting prayer at public school graduation).
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nonsectarian prayer.43 Justice Kennedy stated that the fact that school
officials sought to control the content of the prayer actually counted
against its constitutionality.44 Here is Justice Kennedy’s explanation in
Lee v. Weisman of the difference between the government’s role in
Freedom of Expression cases and Establishment Clause cases:
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different
mechanisms. Speech is protected by ensuring its full expression even
when the government participates, for the very object of some of our
most important speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea
as its own. The method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom
of conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In religious debate or expression, the government is not a prime participant, for the
Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to the freedom of
all. The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and
worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First
Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on
forms of state intervention in religious affairs, with no precise counterpart in the speech provisions. The explanation lies in the lesson of
history that was and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the
lesson that, in the hands of government, what might begin as a tolerant
expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and
coerce. A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is
45
real, not imposed.

According to Justice Kennedy, although it is perfectly
constitutional for the government to express its own views on most
subjects, the government is not permitted to express its opinion about
matters of religion. In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy made it clear
that the government could not cure a violation of the Establishment
Clause by seeking to control the content of an officially-invited prayer.
He said:
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian
prayer, prayer within the embrace of what is known as the JudeoChristian tradition, prayer which is more acceptable than one which,
for example, makes explicit references to the God of Israel, or to Jesus
Christ, or to a patron saint.
. . . Though the efforts of the school officials in this case to find com43. See id. at 581-82 (setting forth the facts of the case).
44. See id. at 588 (stating, “Principal Lee provided Rabbi Gutterman with a copy of the
‘Guidelines for Civic Occasions,’ and advised him that his prayers should be nonsectarian. Through
these means the principal directed and controlled the content of the prayers.”).
45. Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added).
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mon ground appear to have been a good faith attempt to recognize the
common aspects of religions, and not the divisive ones, our precedents
do not permit school officials to assist in composing prayers as an incident to a formal exercise for their students. And these same precedents caution us to measure the idea of a civic religion against the central meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, which is
that all creeds must be tolerated, and none favored. The suggestion
that government may establish an official or civic religion as a means
of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific creeds
46
strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted.

In essence, Justice Kennedy takes the position that if prayer is
allowed in an official setting, then the government may not interfere
with its content. All people have the right to express their own religious
views in a manner consistent with their own faith tradition. This includes
people who are invited to deliver ceremonial prayers at the opening of
official functions.47 In light of Justice Kennedy’s position on this
question, there was no chance of persuading him that the problem with
the prayers uttered before the meetings of the Town Board of Greece
was that they praised Jesus. In his opinion in Town of Greece v.
Galloway, Justice Kennedy stated:
To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force the legislatures that sponsor prayers and the courts that are asked to decide these
cases to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech, a rule that
would involve government in religious matters to a far greater degree
than is the case under the town’s current practice of neither editing or
approving prayers in advance nor criticizing their content after the
48
fact.

Justice Kennedy’s position in this case is consistent with the oft-quoted
language from Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette:49
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstanc-

46. Id. at 589-90 (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., Program, Swearing-In Ceremony for President Barack H. Obama: Fifty-Seventh
Inaugural Ceremonies (Jan. 21, 2013), available at http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearingin/event/barack-obama-2013 (listing the Invocation by Myrlie Evers-Williams and the Benediction
by The Reverend Dr. Luis Leon).
48. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1822 (2014).
49. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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The concept that the government is powerless to interfere with
the content of prayers is consistent with another persistent theme of
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence – that purely subjective objections to
other people’s conduct are not a constitutionally sufficient reason to
prohibit people from engaging in that conduct.
V. OFFENSE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO OFFICIAL PRAYERS OR RELIGIOUS
DISPLAYS IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY RELEVANT
Another consistent precept that Justice Kennedy has followed is
that purely moral considerations are not sufficient to justify a legal
obligation or prohibition. Justice Kennedy applied this principle in a
string of significant cases to strike down laws discriminating against
gays and lesbians.51 More broadly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that a bare desire to harm a class of persons,52 mere
disagreement with an idea,53 irrational fear of a group of people,54 or
moral disapproval of certain conduct,55 without more, are not sufficient
under the Constitution to justify laws treating groups of people
differently or restricting human liberty.
In the context of the Establishment Clause, this means that just
because someone objects to an official prayer or a religious display on
public property does not mean that the prayer or display is
50. Id. at 642.
51. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Kennedy, J.) (striking down state
constitutional provision precluding the adoption of laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013).
52. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking
down federal law intended to prevent “hippies” from qualifying for food stamps, and stating, “[I]f
the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very
least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.”).
53. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (striking down state law making it
a crime to desecrate a venerated object as applied to a person who burned the American flag in
protest, and stating, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.”).
54. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)
(stating, “[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally
retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.”).
55. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating, “Moral
disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection
Clause because legal classifications must not be “drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
burdened by the law.”) (citation omitted).
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unconstitutional. The Establishment Clause is not violated because a
person is offended by an official prayer or a religious display on public
land, nor is it violated because a person does not hold the same religious
belief that is being expressed by the government. Here is what Justice
Kennedy said about “offense” in his opinion for the majority in Town of
Greece v. Galloway:
In their declarations in the trial court, respondents stated that the prayers gave them offense and made them feel excluded and disrespected.
56
Offense, however, does not equate to coercion.

The purpose of the Establishment Clause is not to protect us from
religious messages we disagree with. Its purpose is to protect us from the
unification of church and state. A person could love the religious
message that the government is sending and still object to it on the
ground that the government has violated the Establishment Clause by
expressing that view. When the courts enforce the Establishment Clause,
they are not protecting religious dissenters or minority religions – that is
the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause. Instead, the
Establishment Clause protects every citizen against the grave threat of
official religion.
Justice Kennedy’s position on this point is consistent with the
position of the Court in Freedom of Expression, Equal Protection, and
Right to Privacy cases. Just as moral outrage is not a legitimate reason to
deny same sex couples the right to marry57 or the right of a protestor to
burn the American flag,58 it is also irrelevant in determining whether the
government has violated the Establishment Clause.
The essence of a violation of the Establishment Clause is that the
government has taken a position on a religious question or is interfering
with the internal governance of a religious organization or has allowed a
religious institution to exercise some sort of governmental power in a
manner that advances its religion. Just as government may not dictate the
content of prayers, so it may not take a position on any question of
religion. It is unconstitutional for the government to say that God exists;
and it is equally unconstitutional for the government to say that God
does not exist.
The concept that the government may not take a position on
religious questions leads us to the final portion of this essay wherein I
discuss a question that Justice Kennedy does not address – in my
opinion, the most important issue in the field of Freedom of Religion –
56.
57.
58.

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014).
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
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and that is whether the Constitution requires that the government must
remain neutral in matters of religion.
VI. WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE?
The first words of the First Amendment – the first words of the Bill
of Rights – protect Freedom of Religion:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
59
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .

These two clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause, must be read in tandem. As noted above, until now the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to mean that the
government may not advance, promote, or endorse religion.60 In
addition, the Court has interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to mean that
the government may not intentionally hinder or interfere with the
exercise of religion.61 For nearly 70 years the Supreme Court has
recognized the principle that the government must remain neutral with
respect to religion. Many of our greatest justices have emphasized that
the neutrality principle is at the core of Freedom of Religion:
Justice Hugo Black, Everson v. Board of Education (1947):62
[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used
63
so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.

Justice Tom Clark, School District of Abington Township v. Schempp
(1960):64
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through
a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable
citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize
through bitter experience that it is not within the power of government
to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose,
to advance or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the

59. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) (striking down municipal ordinance prohibiting the ritual slaughter of animals).
62. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding government-subsidized
transportation of children to both public and parochial schools).
63. Id. at 18 (Black, J.) (emphasis added).
64. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (ruling that Bible readings
and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in public school were unconstitutional).
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Justice David Souter, McCreary County v. Kentucky ACLU (2005):66
The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the “First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion,
and between religion and nonreligion.” When the government acts
with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it
violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious
neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible
67
object is to take sides.

Justice Scalia has expressly and emphatically rejected both the “no
endorsement” test and the neutrality principle.68 In his view, the
government does not have to remain neutral with respect to religion, and
it is perfectly constitutional for the government to advance, promote, or
endorse religion.69
In Town of Greece v. Galloway, Justice Kennedy favors a
“tradition” approach over the “no endorsement” test. But he does not
even mention the “neutrality” principle, which has until now been the
lodestone for interpretation of the Religion Clauses.70
I am hopeful that Justice Kennedy and a majority of the Court will
continue to support the principle that the government must remain
neutral on questions of religion. I find support for this in Justice
Kennedy’s statement that the Town Board’s practice would have been
unconstitutional if the purpose and effect of the ceremonial prayer had
been something other than to solemnize the occasion;71 in his
implication that people’s agreement or disagreement with the content of
65. Id. at 226 (Clark, J.) (emphasis added).
66. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (ruling
display of Ten Commandments in county courthouse unconstitutional).
67. Id. at 860 (Souter, J.) (emphasis added).
68. See id. at 889 (Scalia, J. dissenting):
With all of this reality (and much more) staring it in the face, how can the Court possibly
assert that “‘the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between . . . religion and nonreligion,’” and that “[m]anifesting a purpose to favor . . . adherence to religion generally,” is unconstitutional? Who says so? Surely not the words of the Constitution. Surely not the history and traditions that reflect our society’s constant
understanding of those words.
69. See id. at 891 (stating that the government may take action “undertaken with the specific
intention of improving the position of religion”); id. at 893 (suggesting that the government can
“favor” one monotheism over polytheism and atheism in the public acknowledgement of religious
belief); id. at 894 (suggesting that it is only unconstitutional if the government endorses a
“particular religious viewpoint”).
70. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (2014). See cases cited supra notes
61-66 and accompanying text.
71. See Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1823.
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a religious message is irrelevant in determining the constitutionality of
government action under the Establishment Clause;72 and in his
observation that the government has no power to censor prayers that are
uttered in official settings.73
VII. CONCLUSION
This was a close case; a hard case. It turned principally upon a
question of fact: did the Town Board of Greece give people of all faiths
a fair opportunity to solemnize the proceedings before the Town Board
in an act of ceremonial prayer or its secular equivalent? Reasonable
people disagreed on that question of fact, and a majority of the Court
resolved that issue in favor of the Town Board.
Reasonable people may differ, as they did in this case, on the
proper application of the neutrality principle. But the principle itself is
enduring. The founders of this country did not struggle and sacrifice to
preserve a specific tradition of official prayer, but rather for the
overarching principle that the government must always remain neutral
towards religion.

72.
73.

Id.
Id.

